Citizenship encompasses legal status, rights, participation, and belonging. Traditionally anchored in a particular geographic and political community, citizenship evokes notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control, but these relationships are challenged by the scope and diversity of international migration. This review considers normative and empirical debates over citizenship and bridges an informal divide between European and North American literatures. We focus on citizenship within nation-states by discussing ethnic versus civic citizenship, multiculturalism, and assimilation. Going beyond nation-state boundaries, we also look at transnational, postnational, and dual citizenships. Throughout, we identify methodological and theoretical challenges in this field, noting the need for a more dynamic and comprehensive understanding of the inter-relationships between the dimensions of citizenship and immigration.
The large number and diverse origins of international migrants increasingly challenge longheld notions of citizenship within nation-state borders. The United Nations estimates that, in 2005, 191 million people lived outside their country of birth, a figure that has doubled since 1975 and continues to rise (UN Popul. Div. 2006) . At the dawn of the twenty-first century, about one in four or five residents in countries such as Australia (24%), Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (18%) were foreign-born, as were one in eight in Germany (13%), the United States (13%), and Sweden (12%) (OECD 2007) .
1 What happens to citizenship, as a potential force of justice, equality, and national cohesion, when large numbers of people from diverse linguistic, ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds cross state boundaries? How do they affect citizenship in the country to which they move and, if their attachments and activities span borders, what are the consequences for the meaning and substance of citizenship?
Citizenship is usually defined as a form of membership in a political and geographic community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions: legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging. The concept of citizenship allows us to analyze the extent to which immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into receiving societies.
Immigration challenges-and in some cases reaffirms-notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control that have historically been linked to citizenship. These challenges can be studied at two levels of inquiry: one as citizenship within national borders, and the second placing those borders into question. From the within-borders per-1 Migration across international borders usually means the movement of people with one citizenship to a country of a different citizenship, but this is not necessarily the case. For example, migration from former colonies to the colonizing country is international, but these migrants might hold the citizenship of the destination country. Alternatively, birth in a country does not necessarily guarantee citizenship in that country.
spective, we examine three literatures. One studies the foundations of citizenship, linking particular conceptions of national belonging or institutional configurations to conceptions of citizenship as legal status or rights. A second, largely from normative political theory, debates the advisability of multiculturalism and links group rights to citizenship. A third literature, on immigrant integration, investigates equality of participation in a host country's economy, society, and political system. To some degree, these literatures consider how one dimension of citizenship might affect others, but future work needs to examine more deeply how all dimensions of citizenship interact. We suggest that a more integrated approach can show, for example, that the presumed chasm separating multicultural and assimilatory accounts of citizenship might be overdrawn.
The presence and activities of migrants have led some scholars to call into question the relevance of a single, state-centered notion of citizenship, instead conceptualizing citizenship beyond or across borders. One approach relocates the source of citizenship rights from the state to personhood, giving rise to a cosmopolitan or postnational citizenship that transcends borders. A second literature focuses on citizenship across borders, either as a legal status in the form of dual citizenship or as participatory citizenship based on transnational practices and attachments. Our review suggests that globalization challenges simple understandings of citizenship as state-centered and state-controlled. However, nation-states continue to hold substantial power over the formal rules and rights of citizenship and to shape the institutions that provide differentiated access to participation and belonging, with important consequences for immigrants' incorporation and equality.
Throughout this review, we try to bridge an informal divide between scholarship on citizenship in Europe with parallel literatures in North America, especially the United States. For example, debates over postnational citizenship are more prevalent in Europe, whereas the transnational perspective predominates in the United States. It is unclear whether differences in orientation reflect empirical differences in immigrants' experiences or the need for greater academic exchange between European and North American scholars. We also seek to generate a dialogue between the political theory of citizenship-often presented as normative theory-and the sociology of immigration and integration-often presented as an analysis of empirical conditions. Finally, some caveats. We focus on immigrants in industrialized states, in particular in North America and Western Europe, leaving citizenship and immigration within the global South outside our purview. We use the words "immigration" and "immigrant" because they are common in U.S. studies of migration, but we recognize that these terms connote a sense of permanent settlement that might not occur. They also obscure the motivations of migration (political upheaval, economic needs, family reunification, etc.) and immigrants' particular status (undocumented, temporary or permanent legal resident, refugee, asylum seeker, etc.). We touch on some possible repercussions of status differences, but space constraints limit our ability to flesh out fully the impact of large numbers of undocumented economic migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in North America and Europe on the meaning and practices of citizenship. We further limit ourselves by concentrating on international rather than internal migration, but theories of citizenship might apply to certain types of internal migration, such as rural to urban migration in China. Similarly, although ethnicity is a recurrent theme in the literature on citizenship and immigration, it is not the only axis of difference. More work is needed on the relationship between citizenship and immigrants' gender, race, sexuality, class, legal status, and religion because the lens of citizenship reveals not only the legal borders of nation-states, but also their social boundaries.
In what follows, we first discuss the four theoretical dimensions of citizenship. We then turn to literature that centers on citizenship within national borders, followed by literature that puts those borders into question. Throughout, we outline the methodological and theoretical challenges confronting sociologists in this field.
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion. In the Western tradition, citizenship was born in the Athenian city-state, a participatory model in which political engagement in a male-only public sphere was the highest form of activity (Aristotle 1992 , Dynneson 2001 , Heater 2004 ). This conception of citizenship restricted participation, excluding women, those without property, slaves, and newcomers to Athens (Heater 2004 , Pocock 1995 .
An alternate Western tradition, developed from Romans' need to incorporate disparate peoples within the empire, resulted in citizenship as a juridical concept of legal status, in which the citizen is a subject of a state (Dynesson 2001) . During the Enlightenment, justification of subjecthood led to Lockean notions of consent and contract, opening the way to liberalism's language of individual rights, a central part of contemporary citizenship. The extension of rights language in the twentieth century produced ideals of inalienable human rights, although as Arendt's (1979 Arendt's ( [1951 ) examination of stateless individuals makes clear, only the state has the power and institutional apparatus to guarantee the right to have rights (see also Somers 2006) .
Citizenship debates today continue to reflect tensions between citizenship as participation, political or otherwise, and citizenship as legal status, with or without accompanying rights and obligations. These debates also reflect a continuing struggle with the exclusionary aspects of citizenship, particularly those based on gender, sexuality, class, race, ethnicity, and religion.
citizenship that includes four different dimensions: legal status, rights, (political) participation, and a sense of belonging (Bloemraad 2000 , Bosniak 2000 . These dimensions can complement or stand in tension with each other.
Scholars of citizenship as legal status examine who is entitled to hold the status of citizen. Citizenship can be based on place of birth ( jus soli) or parental origins ( jus sanguinis), or both. For residents who cannot access citizenship through birth-as is the case with the overwhelming majority of international migrants-citizenship must be acquired through naturalization. Countries differ in their naturalization requirements, but at a minimum these usually involve a period of legal residency and a demonstration of some knowledge about the country and its dominant language(s) (Bauböck 2001 , Bloemraad 2006 , Odmalm 2005 .
A more expanded understanding of legal citizenship focuses on the rights that accompany citizenship. This perspective, dominant in much theorizing on citizenship, resonates with liberalism's understanding of the relationship between individuals and the state as a contract in which both sides have rights and obligations (Bauböck 1994 , Janoski 1998 , Somers 2006 , Tilly 1996 , Yuval-Davis 1997 . To maintain the citizenship contract, the state guarantees basic rights to individuals, while the individual has the obligation to pay taxes, complete compulsory education, and obey the laws of the country ( Janoski 1998) . The rights approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality.
Citizenship can also be understood as political participation in the governing of people within a territory (Bauböck 2005 , Somers 2005 ). This privilege has historically been exclusionary by gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and class (Pocock 1995 , Magnette 2005 , Smith 1997 , Yuval-Davis 1997 . With time, such barriers were torn down, at least formally. In practice, old exclusions continue to affect political participation. In struggles against such exclusions, participatory and liberal orientations to citizenship converge as political participation is increasingly seen as an individual right and, in some cases, a human right that should be detached from legal status (Brysk & Shafir 2004 , Hayduk 2006 . Some expand the participatory dimension of citizenship further, underscoring that the capacity to participate politically depends in part on social and economic inclusion (Marshall 1950 , Somers 2005 , Yuval-Davis 1999 .
A final dimension of citizenship, that of belonging, spans literatures ranging from philosophies of republican citizenship and communitarianism to the study of nation building. Notions of belonging inherently have exclusionary tendencies; some must fall outside the community in order for a "we" to exist . Such exclusions are often justified by the need for social cohesion, leading to the question of what sort of social cohesion is required for contemporary societies (Brubaker 1992 , Calhoun 2007 , Joppke 1999 . John Stuart Mill (1993 [1859 ) advocated a citizenship joined with "nationality" because a sense of shared political history would lead to a "desire to be under the same government, . . . [a] government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively" (p. 391). The link between nationalism and citizenship influences citizenship theory and practice to this day (Brubaker 2004 , Koopmans et al. 2005 , Miller 2000 , signaling that states are not solely legal and political institutions, but that they also impart cultural or social meaning (Benhabib 2002) .
The four dimensions of citizenship cut across each other, reinforcing or undermining the boundaries and content of citizenship. For example, exclusionary notions of citizenship as belonging might restrict the allocation of status and rights to immigrants and affect their participation in a society. Conversely, if rights are understood broadly and guaranteed regardless of foreign birth, immigrants' legal equality and participation might challenge existing understandings of belonging. We now turn to one attempt to integrate the four dimensions of citizenship.
The Promise and Limits of Marshall's View of Citizenship
The four dimensions of citizenship-legal status, rights, political participation, and even belonging-are reflected in T.H. Marshall's (1950) classic "Citizenship and Social Class," which much sociological work on citizenship takes as its starting point (Somers 2005) . Marshall begins with a definition of citizenship as "a claim to be accepted as full members of the society" (p. 8) and asks whether market economies, with their inherent inequalities, can be reconciled with a notion of full membership.
Sketching out a historical evolution of rights, Marshall suggests that economic changes led to the extension of civil rights, then political rights, and finally, using their political rights, the British working class won social rights. Social rights-which Marshall (1950, p. 11) defines as ranging from the right to "a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society"-would, Marshall hoped, ensure formal and substantive equality (Lister 2003 , Somers 2005 ).
Marshall's notion of full membership views rights not only as valuable in themselves, but also as the means to ensure the solidarity necessary for the functioning of a social democratic welfare state. In this way, citizenship rights and legal status promote participation and a sense of belonging, which in turn facilitate social cohesion and common political projects.
How applicable is Marshall's approach to the study of immigration? Critics argue that Marshall's definition of citizenship is derived from "deeply middle-class, English, male and white" cultural values (Smith 1999, p. 214) that do not take individual subjectivities and cultural differences into account, particularly those of women, children, and racialized minorities (Benhabib 2002 , Brysk 2004 , Maher 2004 , Mann 2001 , Yuval-Davis 1997 . Early studies of "new" post-World War II migration perceived immigrants in class terms and focused on social inequality (e.g., Castles 1986 , Castles & Kosack 1973 , Portes & Bach 1985 , but today immigrants are often identified by their ethnic and racial differences and, increasingly, by religion (Alba 2005 , Kastoryano 2002 , Waters 1999 . Among other consequences, Marshall's focus on the native-born working class prevents him from seeing cultural rights as a distinct prerequisite to full societal participation (Bauböck 2001) . These critiques highlight sources of inequality beyond class position and suggest that other inequalities might require differential group rights.
Considering inequalities beyond class also reveals that the extension of civil, political, and social rights did not uniformly happen according to Marshall's historical progression. In Britain and many other countries, women received social rights before political rights (Lister 2003 , Skocpol 1992 . Similarly, immigrants without the legal status of citizen can be accorded social rights (Bauböck 2005 , Hansen & Koehler 2005 , Soysal 1994 or participate in political decision making (Hayduk 2006 , Leitner & Ehrkamp 2003 .
Despite problems with Marshall's view of citizenship, his concerns with rights, substantive equality, political as well as social and economic participation, membership in community, and social solidarity are relevant to academic studies and public debate about citizenship and immigration. Can his expanded rights-based approach ensure immigrants' full citizenship, or does it result in only partial equalities? Is Marshall correct in presuming that a certain degree of social solidarity is needed to ensure full citizenship for everyone, and if so, can such solidarity be fostered in the context of large-scale immigration? What are the implications of ethnic, religious, and racial pluralism for citizenship's promise of equality? Questions like these return in literatures that situate citizenship within the nationstate and those that transcend nation-state borders.
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CITIZENSHIP WITHIN NATION-STATE BORDERS: DEALING WITH DIFFERENCE
We identify three areas of inquiry that provide theoretical or empirical purchase on citizenship and immigration within the context of the nation-state. First, large-scale migration led political sociologists to research the civic versus ethnic bases of citizenship and the implications of different notions of belonging for immigrants' legal status, rights, and participation. Second, the relationship between rights and community membership is also at the core of theoretical debates on multiculturalism, which ask to what degree rights should inhere in individuals or be granted to ethnic, religious, or other culturally differentiated groups within the nation-state. Finally, Marshall's concerns with social equality are reflected in a literature that discusses economic, social, and political participation in terms of "second-class" citizenship. This research focuses on immigrant assimilation, integration, and incorporation, probing the barriers and pathways to participatory citizenship and social cohesion.
Classifying Countries of Reception: Ethnic versus Civic Bases of Citizenship
In the late 1980s and through the 1990s, questions about when and where immigrants gained citizenship led to an empirical literature that linked national models or trajectories of nationhood to states' willingness to incorporate immigrants as part of the citizenry. Ethnic nationalism is associated with belonging to a nation rooted in descent, a view that usually excludes migrants, as in Germany (pre-2000) . Civic nationalism ties belonging to rights and a universalist, voluntary political membership, and thus arguably offers immigrants a greater chance of inclusion, as in France. Nationalism influences immigrants' membership because it structures formal legal rules regarding the acquisition of citizenship and the discourses that shape citizenship as participation and belonging (Brubaker 1992 , Koopmans et al. 2005 .
The ethnic/civic distinction has spawned a large literature, mostly European, that examines states' responses to immigration through comparative analysis. The majority of such studies use a case-oriented method in which countries as a whole are placed into a typology. Such studies ask how cultural, institutional, or ideological differences create different opportunity structures for migrants' subsequent incorporation and citizenship (Bloemraad 2006 , Castles & Miller 1993 , Favell 2001b , Ireland 1994 , Joppke 1999 , Kastoryano 2002 , Koopmans et al. 2005 .
One line of research has focused on citizenship as legal status. Here, the ethnic/civic distinction offers a cultural or historicalinstitutional argument for why states have particular citizenship-granting practices (Brubaker 1992 , Koopmans et al. 2005 , Odmalm 2005 . Ethnic nationalism matches up with a jus sanguinis descent principle of citizenship and more difficult naturalization procedures. Wellknown countries in this category are Germany (pre-2000), Austria, Greece, and Switzerland. Civic understandings of nationhood coincide with greater access to formal membership for immigrants and their descendants through jus soli birthright citizenship and easier naturalization.
2 Countries in this category include Australia, Canada, France, and the United States.
The ethnic/civic distinction leaves, however, a large gray zone of practices hard to categorize under one label. For example, asking that immigrants learn the majority language can be seen as reinforcing an ethnic sense of nationhood or as promoting civic participation in the political process (Brubaker 2004, pp. 139-40) . Inclusive and exclusionary tendencies can exist within the same state (Kastoryano 2002) . Postwar Germany adopted both ethnic citizenship laws and liberal refugee policies (Herbert 2001 , Joppke 1998 , whereas countries of civic citizenship increasingly define the integration of Muslim immigrants as a cultural problem, spawning courses designed to alter immigrants' beliefs and practices in the name of civic integration (Entzinger 2003 , Joppke & Morawska 2003 .
One response to such criticisms has been to combine an ethnic/civic categorization with other factors posited to affect immigrant citizenship. For example, Koopmans and colleagues (2005, pp. 8-16 ) distinguish between immigrants' access to political and legal citizenship (presented as an ethnic/civic continuum) and states' orientations to group rights (a spectrum from cultural monism to pluralism). Their analysis of laws and policies indicates that, between 1980 and 2002, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland all moved to a more civic orientation in their treatment of immigrants. However, variation in these countries' orientation to cultural pluralism means that scholars need to distinguish the civic, republican universalism of France from the civic multiculturalism of the Netherlands because these two civic models lead immigrants to make quite different membership claims.
The use of civic/ethnic distinctions, and their variants, is predicated on a relatively stable, perhaps deterministic view of societies as fettered in their response to immigration by long-standing cultural understandings and institutional arrangements. Future research will have to consider how and why countries' past practices change in the face of immigration. Some scholars have come to question the "national models" approach altogether, arguing that it artificially elevates the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Thus, Favell (2001a) calls for a reorientation of migration studies away from nation-states to cities and metropolitan areas (see also Penninx et al. 2004 , Sassen 2006 . One study that examines the relative effect of interstate versus intrastate differences concludes that the nation-state context still dominates over internal variation (Koopmans 2004 ), but more research is needed. Finally, some recent scholarship appears to be moving away from a typology approach and more towards a variableoriented methodology. Countries are evaluated on the rigidity or permeability of particular social boundaries faced by immigrants (Alba 2005 , Zolberg & Long 1999 or, using an index, on the degree to which they exhibit a particular characteristic, such as multiculturalism (Banting et al. 2006 ). As we discuss in the next section, the latter effort, in particular, seeks to bridge a divide between normative political theory on immigrant citizenship and empirical social science.
Group Rights and Multiculturalism
A second set of debates over citizenship within nation-state boundaries centers on the promise and pitfalls of multiculturalism, a concept whose meaning varies by context and writer. The term can be used as a demographic description of a society (e.g., the United States is a more multicultural society than Japan); it can refer to an ideology on the part of individuals or government that ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity should be celebrated; it can refer to particular policies or programs undertaken by governments or institutions (e.g., multicultural curricula); or it can refer to a specific normative political theory that lays out principles for governing diverse societies (Abu-Laban 1994 , Bloemraad 2007a , Faist 2000 , Fleras & Elliott 1992 , Kallen 1982 , Joppke 1999 , Roberts & Clifton 1990 .
As political theory, multiculturalism challenges a liberal philosophy of universalism that views humans as freely choosing agents who deserve identical, individual protections. Various commentators point out that liberalism's emphasis on the individual perpetuates or even exacerbates inequalities. Communitarian critiques claim that individual agency is embedded in particular social and cultural collectives that provide individuals with meaning. This legitimates the interests of the group over the individual at certain times and requires a politics of www.annualreviews.org • Citizenship and Immigrationrecognition in which the political community accommodates cultural groups (Miller 2000, p. 99; Taylor 1994) . Others challenge liberalism as a Western cultural construct, imposed on people with different traditions (Parekh 2006), or contend that cultural neutrality is a mythall countries have a "societal culture" that places minority groups in a position of cultural inequality vis-à-vis the majority (Kymlicka 1995 (Kymlicka , 2001 Schachar 2000 Schachar , 2001 . Whereas traditional liberalism demands that states be neutral or blind to cultural diversity, critics argue that such blindness is impossible and instead leads to inequality in rights, belonging, and participation in the public sphere. In Young's (2000, p. 81) words, theory and practice must acknowledge "differences of social position, structured power, and cultural affiliation in political discussion and decision-making that aims to promote justice." A traditional liberal approach to citizenship, according to these critics, would deny immigrants full membership and equality.
Theories of multiculturalism consequently call for the recognition and accommodation of cultural minorities, including immigrants, and require states to create policies or laws that allow minority groups to root their participation in society within their cultural communities (Kymlicka 1995 (Kymlicka , 2001 Kymlicka & Norman 1994; Parekh 2006; Taylor 1994) .
3 Kymlicka, a leading multicultural theorist, attempts to incorporate collective rights within liberalism's individualistic framework. He argues that minority groups may protect their culture and language against majority practices and laws on the grounds that cultural membership is integral to individual freedom and self-respect. Kymlicka's liberalism also requires that groups not con-3 Much of the early theorizing of multiculturalism came from Canadian and British thinkers, who balanced two sorts of minority claims, those of migrant-origin populations and those of long-standing incorporated nations such as the Québécois and the Scots. The multiculturalism of Kymlicka and Taylor, both concerned with Canadian politics, gives greater moral weight to internal national minorities' claims than to those of immigrants. However, the discourse on multiculturalism in continental Europe has almost exclusively focused on immigrants ( Joppke 2004 ). strain individual members' actions, including the right to alter certain practices or to exit the group.
The explosion of scholarly interest in multiculturalism during the 1990s largely revolved around normative theory, with few empirical studies analyzing specific policies and their consequences. Yet abstract debates hold real-life salience when governments and policy makers draft legislation or fund programs according to principles of multiculturalism or universal liberalism (Abu-Laban 2002). Political controversies erupt, for example, over whether religious dress such as headscarves or kirpans may be worn in public institutions such as schools. In the 1990s, numerous countries appeared to embrace multiculturalism, but by the end of the decade, observers noted governments' "retreat" from multiculturalism (Brubaker 2001 , Entzinger 2003 , Joppke 2004 , Korteweg 2006b ). Future research needs to address the gap between philosophy and practice because the paucity of empirical studies allows political actors on all sides to make strong claims based on little evidence.
Theories of multiculturalism imply that multicultural citizenship will foster allegiance to and participation in the state through civic and political attachments. Taylor (1993) talks about a context of "deep diversity," in which individuals' primary allegiance lies with a community of culture and fate, and secondary identification lies with the larger political unit within which the community of fate resides. Critics of multiculturalism worry about the multiple loyalties implicit in it. They fear that without a primary loyalty to the nation-state, the civic, political, and even moral community of a country will fragment, generating problems ranging from limited democratic engagement to a lack of interest in the policies of redistribution (Barry 2001 , Gitlin 1995 , Huntington 2004 , Okin 1999 , Pickus 2005 , Schlesinger 1998 ). In response, Kymlicka (2001) posits that "it is the absence of minority rights which erodes the bonds of civic solidarity" (p. 36). Empirically, we do not know whether countries adopting multicultural orientations are less cohesive than others, or whether immigrants living in states with traditional liberal orientations feel less like full citizens than those in countries that recognize and accommodate cultural communities.
Another criticism of multiculturalism contends that it reifies cultural distinctions, making them appear more important than they are. According to some, this solidifies artificial distinctions of race and ethnicity better overcome through universal citizenship (Barry 2001 , Bissoondath 1994 , Hollinger 2000 . Gender scholars, such as Susan Moller Okin (1999) , have used the issue of reification to argue that multiculturalism facilitates women's oppression within migrant cultures, an oppression best overcome by granting all women universal rights to individual liberty (but see critiques in Okin 1999 , Song 2005 . Other feminists fear that a focus on cultural communities homogenizes minority groups, silencing internal debate and forcing marginal voices within the group to identify with unitary group goals (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 18). Moreover, the discourse of multiculturalism creates an uncritical and depoliticized reading of culture that impedes understanding of structural power differences, such as racism and sexism, and their exclusionary effects (Bannerji 2000). Further empirical research could help disentangle whether multiculturalism fosters gender inequality, as Okin argues, or whether it undermines a politics that addresses structural gender, racial, and other inequalities, as Yuval-Davis and Bannerji suggest.
Future research also needs to break down the meaning and practice of multiculturalism in different times and places. Critiques of multiculturalism often presume that the meaning and content of multiculturalism are easily identifiable and universally the same. Yet a liberal nationalist conception of passive multiculturalism, which confines cultures of origin to the private sphere such as in France or, arguably, the United States, is quite different from cultural pluralism or active multiculturalism in which minority cultures are recognized in policy debates and institutionalized in the public sphere, such as in Canada and, to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands (Bloemraad 2006 (Bloemraad , 2007a Entzinger 2003; Faist 2000) .
Recent scholarship measures multiculturalism as an index, examining specific policy arenas such as education, religious practice, media, dual citizenship, minority cultural activities, bilingual education, and affirmative action (Banting et al. 2006, pp. 56-57) or evaluating cultural requirements for naturalization, religious rights (especially for Islam), cultural rights, institutions for political representation, and affirmative action (Koopmans et al. 2005, pp. 51-71) .
4 These attempts to disaggregate multiculturalism serve two purposes. First, they force scholars to note the variation within and between countries in policies and discourses directed at immigrants. Second, attempts at measurement and operationalization help social scientists evaluate what effect, if any, the degree of multiculturalism has on particular outcomes. For example, if the acquisition of legal citizenship status through naturalization is taken as a measure of political integration, we find a positive correlation between state multiculturalism and levels of naturalization (Bloemraad 2006 , Koopmans et al. 2005 .
A final set of empirical questions concerns diversity, social inequality, and redistribution, harking back to themes raised by T.H. Marshall. Scholars and public commentators in Europe worry that multiculturalism aggravates socioeconomic distinctions as well as cultural ones. According to Koopmans and colleagues (2005) , multiculturalism can foster spatial segregation and hamper migrants' integration into the labor market and educational system, thereby generating economic inequality. More generally, observers wonder whether multicultural policies undermine government provision of public benefits (Barry 2001 , Gitlin 1995 , Gwyn 1995 ). An influential group of economists has advanced the proposition that the more ethno-racially diverse a population, the less likely a country will engage in redistribution (Alesina et al. 2001 , Alesina & Glaeser 2004 . Indeed, a recent study suggests that greater ethno-racial diversity correlates with lower social capital and social trust, although state action might mitigate such effects (Putnam 2007) . Such speculation over mitigating effects is supported by research suggesting that given demographic diversity "countries with strong [multiculturalism policies] saw the largest rise in social spending and the greatest strengthening of their redistributive effort" (Banting et al. 2006, p. 66; Banting & Kymlicka 2003) . Such debates pose a fundamental question: How can societies best deal with multiple inequalities based on culture, religion, race, gender, and socio-economic condition? Does attention to one inequality aggravate others? By addressing such questions, sociologists can ground philosophical debates in empirical research.
Participation and Assimilation
A final area of research from the perspective of nation-state citizenship investigates immigrants' participation in their receiving societies. Traditionally, notions of participatory citizenship are framed as engagement in political governance. Yet as Marshall (1950) points out, we need to consider other modes of participation, particularly those related to economic wellbeing and social inclusion, that underpin people's capacity to act as citizens. Feminist theorists problematize the public/private distinction that underlies much theorizing on citizenship, reminding us that the way nation-states govern familial relations affects participation, often excluding (immigrant) women from full citizenship (Korteweg 2006a; Lister 2003; Pateman 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997 .
From this perspective, citizenship is not necessarily about legal status because formal citizenship and equal participation might not overlap. For example, Germany and France have different citizenship laws and thus differ in how much immigrants can participate in formal politics. However, it is unclear whether residential integration, employment, and educational outcomes are substantially better for Maghrebins in France than for Turks in Germany. Markers of integration such as economic advancement, educational attainment, or cultural acceptance can become measures of secondclass citizenship, whatever one's legal status (Alba & Silberman 2002; Brysk 2004; Ong 1996; Portes & Rumbaut 2001 . Conversely, participation in the labor market or business sector, payment of taxes, participation in local schools, raising families, or other activities that make people an integral part of their local communities and institutions can be understood as a form of participatory citizenship that allows immigrants to make citizenshiplike claims on the state and others, even in the absence of legal citizenship status, and perhaps even in the absence of legal residence (Carens 1987 , Coll 2004 , Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994 , Leitner & Ehrkamp 2003 , Rosaldo 1997 .
In American sociology, the primary way of understanding participation this broadly is through debates about immigrants' assimilation, in either the first or subsequent generations [for more thorough reviews of this literature, see Alba & Nee (2003) , Bean & Stevens (2003) , Waters & Jimenez (2005) ]. Traditionally, assimilation in the United States has been viewed as a largely linear process by which immigrants give up past languages, identities, cultural practices, and loyalties to "become American," with various types of integration thought to follow each other in progressive stages (Alba & Nee 2003 , Gordon 1964 , Park 1930 , Park & Burgess 1969 [1921 , Warner & Srole 1945) . The particular sequence differs from one writer to another, as do opinions of how many generations full assimilation takes, but these accounts suggest that integration is possible and even inevitable.
Today, numerous U.S. scholars are less sanguine about the process and outcome of integration. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing to the present, models of resurgent or reactive ethnicity and segmented assimilation challenge the idea of a single sequential path to assimilation, suggesting that racial hierarchies and/or limited economic opportunities shape identities and integration (Glazer & Moynihan 1963 , Portes & Rumbaut 2006 , Portes & Zhou 1993 , Zhou 1999 ). This literature argues that immigrants' race and economic positions intersect to create three distinct incorporation pathways: traditional assimilation into the white middle class; selective integration when immigrants of color retain ethnic ties and culture to facilitate upward socio-economic mobility; or "downward" assimilation into a racialized urban minority with limited economic opportunities.
The debate over assimilation is ongoing. Alba & Nee (1997 contend that intergenerational integration into an American cultural, social, and economic mainstream remains the dominant empirical pattern, and they reclaim the word assimilation (which today tends to be viewed negatively) as an accurate description of the social world (see also Brubaker 2001) . In current formulations, assimilation (or alternatives such as integration or incorporation) usually means the narrowing of differences between immigrants and the native-born majority population in certain aspects of social life (e.g., labor force participation), but leaves open difference along other, often cultural, lines ranging from food preferences to "fundamental beliefs and ideas regarding existence" (Zolberg & Long 1999, p. 8) . Such reformulations undermine an oft-posited dichotomy between an ideology of multiculturalism or one of assimilation. The idea of "integration" consequently becomes much closer to certain notions of multiculturalism.
Within assimilation research, cultural assimilation, social integration, and economic mobility receive primary attention; civic and political integration are secondary (but see Bloemraad 2006 , Chung 2005 , CorderoGuzman 2005 , Portes & Rumbaut 2006 , Smith 2005 ). Perhaps as cause or consequence of the limited attention to civic and political integration, the relationship between immigrants' political citizenship and other participation is undertheorized. Political incorporation might facilitate socio-economic assimilation if immigrants and their children use political power to change institutional barriers blocking their mobility. Alternatively, limited socio-economic incorporation might spur immigrants' political mobilization or impede their political participation. Future research should examine how political citizenship affects other forms of participation, and vice versa. In addition, scholarship on participation and assimilation in the American context could pay more attention to the state, beyond entry policy or antidiscrimination measures.
European research, by contrast, sees a variety of state-based policies, some assimilationist, others more multiculturalist, as affecting integration (Entzinger 2003 (Entzinger , 2006 Fournier & Yurdakul 2006; Joppke 2004; Korteweg 2006b ). European policies increasingly focus on culture and have the integration of Muslim immigrants as their central problematic. Cultural concerns often focus on gender relations in ongoing debates about how to regulate or sanction forced marriage and honor killings, as well as the wearing of hijab, niqab, and burqa (Fournier & Yurdakul 2006 , Korteweg 2006b , Razack 2004 . These practices are often seen as antithetical to European values of gender equality and emblematic of the perceived antiliberal, antidemocratic influence of Islam (Okin 1999) . Such European worries over problematic immigrant cultures stand in contrast to much of the American scholarship, which often sees immigrant cultures as protective against the negative influence of U.S. culture and thus conducive to integration and better socio-economic outcomes (Portes & Rumbaut 2001 , Zhou & Bankston 1998 but see Huntington 2004) .
There is some bridging of American and European approaches to integration and assimilation in work that compares the position of immigrant groups in the United States, France, and Germany (Alba 2005 the language of boundaries to identify social, cultural, legal, and policy practices that differentiate immigrants and their descendants from the majority. In doing so, they bring together U.S. considerations of social boundaries with European attention to state policies in the process of immigrant integration. They also move from a comparative case-oriented methodology to a variable-oriented one in which boundaries become the key analytical focus.
Thus, the various debates on citizenship and immigration within nation-states emphasize different dimensions of citizenship. Discussions of ethnic versus civic citizenship examine the link between legal status, political participation, and belonging to the nation-state. Debates over multiculturalism center on rights and belonging. Research on assimilation and integration considers, implicitly or explicitly, an expanded notion of citizenship as participation in all dimensions of social life. All wrestle with how to achieve citizenship's promise of substantive equality. Yet each area could also be expanded and deepened if researchers integrated intersections between the dimensions of citizenship more fully into their empirical and theoretical work.
TRANSCENDING BORDERS: POSTNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Much of the discussion of citizenship-as legal status, rights, full participation, or belongingsituates research and analysis squarely within the borders of the country within which immigrants settle. Over the past two decades an expansive and growing literature questions such a bounded approach, raising normative and empirical questions about the relevance of state borders. Is state sovereignty undermined by new supranational institutions and global human rights norms, and if so, is the importance of formal citizenship decreasing for today's immigrants? At a normative level, should statebased citizenship be the key way of understanding membership and allocating rights? Should notions of belonging be exclusively tied to a single state, or can they be promoted across state boundaries so that people can live cosmopolitan or transnational lives? If individuals increasingly see their lives and attachments spanning political borders, how will this affect political participation and social cohesion, topics so central to certain "within borders" debates about immigrant citizenship? In this section we consider citizenship as transcending the nation-state, in scholarship on cosmopolitanism and postnationalism, and citizenship as spanning multiple nation-states, in scholarship on transnationalism and dual citizenship.
Citizenship Beyond Borders: Cosmopolitan and Postnational Citizenship
Within liberal theory, cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism represent two poles in a theoretical debate over the relationship between state borders and the rights guaranteed by citizenship (Vertovec & Cohen 2002) . Political cosmopolitanism argues that rights ought to transcend national boundaries; liberal nationalism argues that individual rights are best guaranteed within the context of the nation-state (Bosniak , 2006 Calhoun 2007; Carens 1987 ). An open, empirical question is whether the social solidarity presumed necessary to facilitate democratic participation and redistributive social policies can be fostered outside the context of the nation-state (or in the context of an extremely permeable nation-state) given that the emotional aspects of such solidarity are difficult to promote outside affective communities (Calhoun 2007 , Turner 1993 . At a practical level, without institutions such as courts and policing apparatuses, it is unclear how rights can be guaranteed absent a state-like structure. As Arendt (1979 Arendt ( [1951 ) notes in reflecting on the atrocities of World War II, rights might be inalienable and universal, but the stateless have few protections. This leads Bosniak (2006) to raise a paradox of liberalism: Only by curtailing the liberty of individuals who fall outside a given nation-state can the liberty of those within be guaranteed.
Yet numerous scholars point out that state borders are increasingly penetrated by flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas (e.g., Castles 2002 , Castles & Davidson 2000 , Portes et al. 1999 , Smith & Guarnizo 1998 , Vertovec 2004 . International capitalism links disparate economies and regions, in some cases generating migration from the global South to the North when foreign investment or large development projects destabilize traditional economies (Massey et al. 1998 , Sassen 1998 . Powerful multinational corporations constrain states' sovereignty, while the growing number of international free trade agreements similarly push markets beyond state borders. Advances in international transportation and communication technologies allow migrants to maintain more sustained cross-border ties, and such advances facilitate the circulation of ideas and cultures on a global scale, helped along by transnational or international economic, social, religious, and political organizations (Portes et al. 1999 , Levitt 2001 , Smith 2003 . Finally, scholars point to the spread and institutionalization of human rights as a constraint on states' actions (Brysk & Shafir 2004 , Soysal 1994 . These dynamics suggest that globalization is a reality that undermines the relevance of borders and state sovereignty. Sophisticated theories of cosmopolitanism argue that we need political institutions that give (collective) social actors parity with global economic actors (Habermas 2003) and that such institutions should be rooted in shared universal values while recognizing cultural particularisms (Beck & Grande 2007) .
The global human rights argument is especially prominent in scholarship on postnational membership. It contends that the expansion of a human rights discourse and legal apparatus compels nation-states to extend membership rights to immigrants based on personhood rather than membership in a particular political unit (Bauböck 1994 , Jacobson 1996 , Soysal 1994 ). According to these scholars, the moral power of human rights, the development of international bodies such as the United Nations, European Union, and international courts of justice, and the advocacy work of international social movements undermine statebased citizenship.
5 Although states matter, they are increasingly constrained by international law and human rights, making a narrow, statedefined citizenship increasingly illegitimate.
Most evidence to support postnational citizenship comes from Western Europe. Soysal's (1994) influential study of six European countries argues that regardless of where they reside, Turkish immigrants are given civil rights, many social rights, and even some political rights. Political rights tend to be those most tied to nation-state citizenship, but countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and New Zealand allow noncitizens local voting rights (Bauböck 2005 , Hayduk 2006 . Even in Japan, Gurowitz (1999) argues, pro-migrant advocates used international human rights norms and appeals to "the standards of international society" to pressure local and prefecture governments into providing greater rights for noncitizens (p. 445). Although nation-states will not disappear any time soon, various researchers find "a shift in the major organizing principle of membership in contemporary polities: the logic of personhood supersedes the logic of national citizenship" (Soysal 1994, p. 164) .
The European Union is one site in which a certain postnational citizenship might be coming to fruition. EU citizenship tries to create a new idea of belonging to an overarching "European" identity and institution, and it also sets up a standard and ideal of European citizenship against which national or local policies concerning immigrants can be compared (Lahav 2004 ). Yet EU citizenship also resembles traditional nation-state citizenship: The status of EU citizen is only open to citizens of EU member countries and cannot be given directly to immigrants from non-European countries (Parekh 2006) . This raises two questions. How important is this form of postnational citizenship to those who have access to it? How do the exclusionary aspects of European Union citizenship affect immigrants' incorporation at the national level?
The postnational approach has been criticized on at least three grounds. First, despite some evidence of noncitizen rights, postnationalism lacks extensive empirical support (Faist 2000 , Koopmans & Statham 2003 , Tambini 2001 . Postnational scholars appear to be making a prediction or outlining a normative desire, rather than describing objective conditions (Stasiulis 1997) . Second, some contend that it is redundant to announce the "rediscovery" of human rights in global discourse because these are already present in liberal democratic practices ( Joppke 1999) . Finally, critics claim that scholars of postnational citizenship fail to analyze immigrant agency and the actual frames and targets of migrant mobilizing at a local level. Doing so, one finds that the reference of political mobilization for many immigrants lies in their own ethno-national networks or in national publics and governments, not with international actors or supranational institutions, though immigrants at times do make appeals to human rights to advance their claims ( Jacobson & Ruffer 2004 , Koopmans & Statham 1999 , Koopmans et al. 2005 .
A question for further study concerns the appropriate location for social rights and economic protections. Many postnational arguments presume that the erosion of statecentered citizenship is a good thing in that human rights protect people from an arbitrary state. Yet, to the extent that the state also protects people from the vagaries of the international market, postnational citizenship might be a path to reduced social benefits as citizenship is redefined vis-à-vis a global market rather than political or community membership.
Thus, scholars need to examine how much state-based citizenship matters in migrants' everyday lives and how global human rights might affect immigrants' citizenship practices (Somers 2006; but see Brysk 2004 , Lentin 2007 . Postnational approaches, like other theories of citizenship that use simple dichotomies between citizens and noncitizens, often ignore the many, variable statuses migrants can hold within a country, such as asylum seeker, refugee, or undocumented immigrant (Morris 2002). The focus on citizenship status may obscure how legal residence can structure migrants' life chances more than citizen/noncitizen distinctions. Massey (2007) argues forcefully that lack of status now joins race, class, and gender as a central axis of stratification in American society.
An estimated 30% of the foreign-born population in the United States and 10% of all migrants in Europe do not have a legal right to reside in the countries in which they live (Koser 2007, p. 59; Massey 2007, chapter 4; Passel 2006) . Lack of legal documentation undermines feelings of security and belonging, the ability to participate fully in the political system, and the ability to negotiate with citizen employers over work conditions (Menjívar 2006 , Stasiulis & Bakan 2005 . What happens to the legitimacy of liberal democratic states when millions of temporary or unauthorized migrants live and participate in these societies but have no avenue for eventual legal citizenship and live in fear of deportation? The challenges faced by undocumented migrants highlight the continued salience of the state, which through granting or withholding residency and citizenship status profoundly affects immigrants' life chances.
Citizenship Across Borders: Transnationalism and Dual Citizenship
Whereas postnationalists believe supranational institutions and human rights norms undermine traditional state-based citizenship, a transnational approach underscores the existence (and perhaps normative preference) for multiple memberships within the current system of state sovereignty (Faist 2000 , Vertovec 2004 ). Multiple memberships fuel a "deterritorialized" citizenship transcending geographically defined political and legal entities (Basch et al. 1994) . Unlike in other work on citizenship and migration, the emigrant status of international migrants receives as much, if not more, attention than immigrant status.
Transnationalism. Research on transnationalism suggests that pressure for deterritorialized citizenship comes from at least two different sources. First, "migrants, through their daily life activities and social, economic and political relations create social fields that cross national boundaries" (Basch et al. 1994, p. 27) . Through hometown associations, business investments, religious affiliations, and political ties, migrants retain ties to their country of origin, leading lives in two or more settings (Levitt 2001 (Levitt , 2007 Portes et al. 1999) . Second, sending and receiving states can also promote transnational activities and allegiances (Faist 2007b , Levitt 2000 , Smith 2003 . Sending countries, in particular, can view continued ties to emigrants as an instrument to encourage financial remittances or investment in the country of origin and as a way to expand political, social, and economic borders to diasporas (Itzigsohn 2007) . Together, migrants' and states' actions contribute to the process of deterritorialized nation building.
The simultaneous dynamics of transnational citizenship can be seen most clearly in crossborder political participation, although this form of participation is certainly not the only type of transnationalism. Nation-states, political parties, or political movements can look for ideological, financial, and organizational support among expatriates living overseas, while expatriate citizens can push particular agendas on policy makers in the host and/or the sending country (Fox 2005 , Guarnizo et al. 2003 , Itzigsohn 2000 , Itzigsohn et al. 1999 . For example, a study of Mexican and Dominican Republic immigrants in the United States shows how political officials of the sending countries promote dual citizenship to encourage the flow of remittances and because dual nationals can affect U.S. policy toward the sending countries (Itzigsohn 2007) . Similarly, Kurds in Germany seek to intervene in the human rights challenges of the Kurdish minority in Turkey by creating political strategies directed at policy makers in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2002) . More generally, scholars of transnationalism argue that integration into the host society and the maintenance of cross-border ties are not incompatible (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004) .
Researchers trying to measure the breadth and depth of transnationalism often find that only a small proportion of immigrants can be characterized as active transmigrants, that transnational activism declines with time in the country of settlement, and that it rarely survives into the second generation, though scholars debate the proper way to measure transnationalism (DeSipio et al. 2003 , Levitt & Waters 2002 , Rumbaut 2002 . Some research suggests that immigrants facing blocked mobility, especially men, turn to political participation in the homeland as a counterweight to lost status (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo 2005 , Jones-Correa 1998 . Others question the transnational paradigm in toto, arguing that receiving states effectively transform foreigners into nationals by altering immigrants' perceptions of belonging (Waldinger 2007) . Nevertheless, such findings do not preclude that feelings of belonging to the new home country can coincide with activity on behalf of the sending country. Questions for those studying transnational citizenship include empirical questions regarding its scope and importance, as well as further theorizing as to why certain societies or groups might be more or less inclined to embrace transnational citizenship.
Dual citizenship. One manifestation of deterritorialized memberships is the increasing number of states permitting, and even promoting, dual or multiple citizenship (Bauböck 2007 , Faist & Kivisto 2007 , Fox 2005 , Hansen & Weil 2002 , Jones-Correa 2001 , Weil 2001 . Whereas a century ago most states viewed dual citizenship as bigamy, increasing numbers of states allow legal attachments to multiple countries, sometimes because of international conventions, at other times because of domestic policy or emigrant mobilization (Spiro 2004) .
Countries apply rules about dual citizenship differentially. For example, countries more used to emigration than immigration can target their own emigrants abroad, but not extend dual citizenship to immigrants who live in their www.annualreviews.org • Citizenship and Immigrationown borders, as in the case of Poland (Faist 2007b , Górny et al. 2007 ). Conversely, some traditional immigration countries show limited enthusiasm for dual citizenship, worried about the trade-off between political autonomy and transnational citizenship (Bauböck 2007, p. 81) . In the United States, Supreme Court decisions and State Department directives permit multiple citizenship, yet the oath that all would-be citizens must swear still contains a promise to renounce prior allegiances (Ansgar 1991 /1992 , Duckett 2000 , Spiro 1997 ). For those troubled by dual citizenship, multiple membership raises questions of competing loyalties and obligations-for whom does one fight in the event of a military conflict?-as well as concerns about immigrant integration and political cohesion (Hammar 1985 , Pickus 2005 , Renshon 2001 , Schuck 1998 but see Bloemraad 2007b) .
In the European Union, the dual citizenship of non-EU nationals has been a central sticking point in debates of German citizenship reform, with those concerned about multiple membership arguing that dual citizenship may prevent immigrant integration . 6 In Sweden, however, dual citizenship, adopted in 2001, was seen as a human rights issue (Spång 2007) . The contrast between Germany and Sweden demonstrates that arguments against dual citizenship attempt to make "citizenship conditional on the assumption of certain duties by immigrants, whereas arguments in favor of dual citizenship emphasize individual rights" (Gerdes & Faist 2007, p. 138) .
There are at least three aspects of multiple citizenship that require further research. As Kivisto (2007) suggests, we need to know more about citizenship decision making and the state actors (both elites and nonelites) who resist or embrace dual citizenship, especially in 6 Germany's new citizenship law, in force since 2000, allows children born in Germany to immigrant parents to hold dual citizenship, although the child must give up his or her other citizenship between the ages of 18 to 23 to remain a German national (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2000).
comparative perspective. Second, we need to know more about people who choose or reject dual citizenship to understand better the reasons for their choices (but see Bloemraad 2004) . Third, research is needed on the relationship between dual citizenship and its effects on migrant activities. It is unclear, for example, how dual citizenship affects the flow of remittances. The available evidence does, however, suggest that permitting multiple citizenships likely enhances, rather than undermines, political incorporation by encouraging immigrants' naturalization and expanding the "training ground" in which people learn transferable political skills (Bloemraad 2004 , DeSipio et al. 2003 , Jones-Correa 2001 .
Reading across the literature on transnationalism, one is struck by the fact that most empirical research has centered on the United States as the primary country of reception, whereas it is still an emerging field in Canada or Europe (but see Caglar 2001 , Faist & Kivisto 2007 , Faist &Özveren 2004 , Landolt 2007 . We need to know whether this is because immigrants in the United States are more likely to lead transnational lives, or whether scholars in other countries have been slower in adopting a transnational framework. Furthermore, most scholars focus on multiple citizenship across nation-states, but one could easily envisage multiple political memberships in different territorial units (Bauböck 2003 , Favell 2001a . A number of cities have increasingly tried to exercise some control over the rights and responsibilities of residents in a manner similar to statebased citizenship, so that we could imagine talking about a particular migrant being a citizen of New York City and Mexico (RC Smith 1998), or of Berlin and Turkey (Caglar 2001) . Importantly, all versions of multiple citizenship continue to see a political unit, one with some ability to make political decisions and exercise enforcement, as the source of rights and membership status.
In sum, both postnational and cosmopolitan citizenship link legal status to persons rather than territory, raising questions about how to secure rights that are overwhelmingly guaranteed by states. Transnational and dual citizenship extend people's ability to participate in and belong to multiple, territorially based political units. All these treatments of citizenship question the link between citizenship and a single nation-state. However, the dimensions of citizenship-status, rights, participation, and belonging-remain the salient axes in evaluating notions of equality.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: THE INTERSECTION OF THEORY AND METHODS
We have argued for a broad conceptualization of citizenship along four dimensions-status, rights, participation, and belonging. This conceptualization helps link normative concerns about equality and inclusion with empirical research that investigates (a) whether immigrants' life chances are equivalent to those of nativeborn nonimmigrants, (b) the extent of immigrants' participation in formal and informal politics, and (c) how social, economic, and political participation are connected to belonging. Yet we find a gap between abstract political theory and empirical social science. Above, we highlight areas in which normative citizenship claims have researchable implications. Here, we conclude with some observations about the normative implications of empirical research, recommending greater focus on immigrants' agency.
Sociologists of citizenship and immigration face dilemmas of methodology, measurement, and reference points that speak to the heart of normative and theoretical debates around citizenship. Empirical data on immigrants' membership and participation can quickly become recast as evidence for "successful" or "failed" integration, rife with implicit or explicit notions of "good citizenship" and distinctions between "better" and "problematic" immigrant groups. In the United States, Huntington's (2004) charge that Mexican migrants are failing to integrate into American society and that the United States needs to return to the roots of it Anglo-Protestant creed carry a strong assimilatory notion of "good citizenship" with decidedly religious and cultural overtones. 7 In European countries such as Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, many studies of immigration focus on the problematic integration of Muslim communities and government strategies for improving integration policies (Kastoryano 2002 , Koopmans et al. 2005 . The challenge for researchers is to recognize Muslims' diverse ethno-national and religious backgrounds and not to attach "good citizenship" to a measure of "Europeanization," which in popular debate is often understood as assimilation into a Judeo-Christian culture or, at the least, the abandonment of public signifiers associated with Islam.
Such cautions do not mean that researchers should abandon attempts to adjudicate between successful and failed integration. Rather, we must carefully specify success and failure to avoid normative pitfalls. For instance, most people, including immigrants, would agree that learning a host society's dominant language facilitates economic advancement, political and civic participation and social interaction with fellow residents. Thus, language acquisition is often used as a marker of integration. Recently, countries like the Netherlands have increased language requirements for legal residency or citizenship status. But do limited majority language skills necessarily mean failed integration and bad citizenship? What about retaining the language of origin? Historically, in the United States, "Americanization" efforts promoted the abandonment of immigrants' native language, yet research suggests that those who are fully bi-or multilingual have better cognitive and educational outcomes and, for immigrant families, better intergenerational relations (Peal & Lambert 1962 , Portes & Hao 2002 , Portes & Rumbaut 2001 . Does good citizenship, locally or globally, require multilingualism of immigrants and majority populations? The question of appropriate indicators is critical for public policy and academic scholarship.
Another thorny methodological issue centers on reference points: Who should demonstrate integration, at what point in time, and compared with whom? Do we judge integration and full citizenship over an immigrant's life course or, as many American scholars of assimilation do, should we instead evaluate second and third generation progress? European research has largely focused on the immigrant generation, in part because statistics identifying the second generation are limited given recent migration or political restrictions on collecting such data (but see Alba & Silberman 2002 , Simon 2003 . Careful statistical work, in addition to other methodologies, will be important in evaluating whether immigrants and their descendants hold "second-class citizenship," in T.H. Marshall's (1950) holistic sense of citizenship.
Future research also must think carefully about the standard to which immigrants are held. Usually, evidence for immigrants' failure to integrate or for anti-immigrant discrimination-often alternative interpretations of the same data-rely on comparison with the "average" native-born citizen. One could argue, however, that immigrants should be compared to people with comparable human capital (Alba & Nee 2003 , Bean & Stevens 2003 , or that immigrants should be held to higher standards because immigration is a privilege accorded by established citizens (Borjas 1999). Cross-country comparisons between immigrant groups can also illuminate the effects of particular social and historical contexts on immigrant integration, including historical legacies of racial stratification. Although often obscured in the "Data and Methods" section of an article or placed in the "Methodological Appendix" of a book, decisions about measurement and reference points reflect important theoretical assumptions regarding the meaning and embodiment of citizenship.
Beyond measurement, future research must take immigrant agency into account. Many studies focus on receiving states and their policies, neglecting how immigrant groups respond to citizenship laws and integration policies, and how their presence and participation affect the meanings and practices of citizenship (but see Foner 2003 , Jacobson & Ruffer 2004 , Yurdakul & Bodemann 2006 . Future research should examine how immigrant groups define and negotiate their own citizenship, thereby building more dynamic theories that allow for change over time.
Finally, the study of citizenship and immigration cannot be viewed as uniquely the domain of immigration scholars. Rather, the intersection of citizenship and immigration raises broad issues of inequality, state power, and social cohesion. T.H. Marshall's seminal text on citizenship and class reflects such concerns. Yet his work is grounded in an understanding of citizens as born and raised in their country of residence. In the twenty-first century, international migration not only renders axes of internal differentiation more complex, but also challenges the salience of the borders separating one nation-state from another. If largescale immigration continues-and all indications suggest that it will-social scientists of all types will need to consider the repercussions of migration for notions of status, the allocation of rights, participation in global and multiple local societies, and feelings of belonging that are captured by the notion of citizenship.
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